In this paper we present the results of a study on the effects of asset ageing on the reliability and affordability of the collective regional electricity grids of The Netherlands.
INTRODUCTION
A challenge for DNOs is the realization of a socially optimal trade-off between reliability and customer costs. After all, a perfectly reliable grid comes at a prohibitive price. As a result of ageing of grid components, or assets, postponement of replacement investments can lead to a deterioration of reliability. At the same time, early replacements will have adverse consequences for the (shortterm) affordability for customers. It is the challenge for a DNO to replace aged parts of the grid at the right time, in order to achieve the desired future-proof quality of service and low customer costs.
This has given rise to a study, conducted under the flag of Netbeheer Nederland, the association of Dutch electricity and gas grid companies, by a delegation of experts from all Dutch DNOs for electricity. In alphabetical order, these are: Cogas, DNWB, Endinet, Enexis, Liander, Rendo, Stedin, and Westland Infra. Its objective: to obtain a collective view on the effects of asset ageing on reliability and affordability, and to provide insight into replacement policies to anticipate these effects.
APPROACH
The following phases were completed:
1. Determination of the current structure, asset populations and age distributions of the collective Dutch regional electricity grids. 2. Determination of the current and estimation of the expected future failure behaviour of assets. 3. Development of a numerical model which predicts future asset failures and their effects on reliability and affordability, and which calculates the theoretically optimal replacement policy. 4. Determination and evaluation of common scenarios.
The study adopts an umbrella approach, in which different types of electricity components, or asset types, are combined in one model, which forms an outline representation of the current grid. The central question is what the optimal replacement policy is for these asset types during the next decades. The optimization problem has been formulated as a Linear Program. The objective function is the net present value (NPV) of a weighted sum of expected risk costs and preventive replacement costs, minimized over a planning horizon of up to 100 years. The discount factor used in the NPV calculations is based on the weighted average cost of capital (WACC) as determined by the Dutch energy regulator for the current regulation period for the DNOs. The model input comprises the following elements.
Grid structure
The structure of the collective Dutch regional electricity grids has been determined by means of a collection of asset types. In total, 24 asset types are distinguished, distributed over various asset categories, e.g., transformers, switchgear, protection and cables. Each asset type has a current age distribution. By way of illustration, Figure 1 shows the cumulative amounts, per year of construction, of MV/LV transformers that are currently (still) present in the grid. 
Reliability
In 
Failure curves
Ideally, the decision if and when to replace assets is taken on the basis of as much information as possible, preferring factual observations to assumptions. In our study we have subdivided the determination of the failure behaviour of assets into historical failure behaviour on the one hand and expected future failure behaviour on the other. Although future failing will manifest itself only with the lapse of time, it can be estimated by means of available historical failure data and expert judgement. The model considers agedependent failures, e.g., as a result of corrosion or wear, and age-independent failures, e.g., as a result of third party interference, in particular excavation work. Furthermore, failures are considered to be either fatal or non-fatal. Fatal means the asset is beyond repair and must be replaced correctively; non-fatal means the asset is still repairable.
For each asset type we have defined a failure curve, which incorporates both age-dependent and age-independent failure behaviour, and a fatality curve. For each age the failure curve indicates the failure probability in the next year and the fatality curve indicates the probability that such a failure is fatal. The model is flexible to such an extent that both curves can take arbitrary shapes. Besides simulating the physical failure behaviour of components, the fatality curve can be used to simulate a deficiency of spare parts or knowledge of obsolete components.
Using extensive failure data from Nestor, the failure curves have been constructed and calibrated such that for each asset type the number of failures in the coming year as projected by the model equals the actual average yearly number of failures. For MV cables, divided into PILC and XLPE, a remaining life model developed by KEMA [2] was used to construct the failure curves. For transformers and switchgear, Weibull distributions as modelled in [3] were adopted.
Failure costs
Depending on the asset type and failure cause, failures lead to a number of CML. Using Nestor, for each asset type the expected number of CML per failure was determined. Besides interruption, failures lead to costs. Non-fatal failures lead to costs of repair, whereas fatal failures lead irrevocably to corrective replacement costs. The expected costs of non-fatal failures and preventive replacements have been determined using index prices and subsequent calculations for real, finished projects.
Policy constraints
The model allows for a variety of constraints, which can be used to enforce certain replacement policies. For the purpose of our study we have implemented two constraints in particular. The first concerns minimum and maximum numbers of preventive replacements, which can be specified per year and per asset type (or group of asset types). Minimum amounts can be used to effectuate replacements commissioned by supervisory authorities, maximum amounts to model capacity or budget constraints, and fixed amounts to evaluate existing replacement programmes.
The second constraint concerns a reliability risk tolerance. For each year in the future a maximum SAIDI can be specified. The optimization routine will then determine the most favourable replacement policy that obeys this condition, or indicate that such a policy does not exist.
RESULTS
In this section we discuss the numerical results obtained from our model, based on scenarios collectively agreed on.
Common scenarios
We consider the scenarios listed in Table 1. replacement policy valuation CML 0 -None 1 -Plans issued in 2009 2 -Theoretically optimal a -€ 0.50 / b -€ 1 / c -€ 5 3 -Theoretically optimal SAIDI target: 24 minutes Table 1 Common scenarios Scenario 0 is a (fictitious) base scenario, which evaluates the consequences of not carrying out any preventive replacements at all. In this scenario, assets are only replaced after a fatal failure. As part of scenario 1, these percentages are considered to be "structural", i.e., they are considered to apply to the further future as well. For non-mentioned asset types, such as MV/LV transformers, protection and LV switchgear, structural annual replacements of 0.2% are assumed.
Scenario 2 considers the theoretically optimal replacement policy, based on two different valuations of reliability used by Dutch DNOs, namely 0.50 €/CML and 1 €/CML, and in addition a substantially higher valuation of 5 €/CML. Finally, scenario 3 considers the effect of a SAIDI target. This embodies the strategic objective to maintain the current reliability towards the future. In this scenario the optimal replacement policy is computed under the explicit condition that each year the expected SAIDI does not exceed 24 minutes, which is the current reliability.
Comparison of future SAIDI
Below we discuss the numerical results obtained for the scenarios described above, focusing on the implication for the reliability and the level of replacement investments. The main result is captured by Figure 2 , which shows the expected development of the SAIDI over the next 50 years.
Figure 2 Projected development of the SAIDI

Scenario 0: No preventive replacements
The green curve in Figure 2 shows that only replacing assets correctively will lead to an accelerating increase in the SAIDI, reaching 80 minutes by 2060. This illustrates the importance of timely replacements.
Scenario 1: Plans issues in 2009
We see from the purple curve in Figure 2 that the current 5-year plans suffice to maintain the current reliability for the planning horizon it was issued for. With a prolongation of these plans, the current reliability can be maintained until around 2020. Thereafter, the SAIDI will start to increase steadily, reaching 30 minutes around 2030 and subsequently by roughly 10 minutes per decade. Hence, a structural continuation of the replacement percentages as recorded from the 2009 plans will be insufficient to achieve a longterm continuation of the current reliability.
Scenario 2: Theoretically optimal replacement policy
By not imposing any fixed replacement numbers, we enable the model to compute the theoretically optimal replacement policy. We see from Figure 2 that valuations of 0.50 €/CML and 1 €/CML both result in a gradual increase in the SAIDI. Apparently, these valuations, in combination with the failure behaviour and age distribution of the grid, do not outweigh the cost of preventive replacement. As a result of the optimal trade-off between reliability and affordability, a much higher SAIDI is accepted. Furthermore, it appears from Figure 2 that the current replacement plans correspond to a valuation of roughly 1 €/CML and that a valuation of at least 5 €/CML is required to maintain the current reliability in the distant future.
Scenario 3: Theoretically optimal replacement policy
By imposing a maximum annual SAIDI of 24 minutes, we can assess the feasibility of the strategic objective to maintain the current reliability towards the future. We can see from Figure 2 that in expectation this is indeed possible. The other side of the coin is that this will inevitably require higher replacement investments. These consequences are discussed below.
Comparison of future replacement investments
For scenarios 1-3, Table 3 summarizes the financial consequences for the next 50 years of the resulting replacement programmes. In particular for MV and LV cables, the replacement percentages prescribed by the optimal policy with SAIDI target are considerably higher than in the current 5-year plans. In terms of capital, it turns out that two thirds of the replacement investments involve (underground) cables and one third involves all other (i.e., overground) components. For illustration, Figure 3 shows the projected development of the remaining population of MV and LV PILC. 
AUXILIARY MEASURES
Besides preventive replacement of components, the reliability of an ageing electricity network can be maintained by several other approaches:  Distribution automation: Increasing the part of the network where the control center can restore power with remotely controlled switches and disconnectors will greatly enhance the reliability.  Intensified maintenance: Increasing the knowledge of failure modes of components can lead to preventive maintenance measures to avoid failures.
 Prevention of failures due to excavations: A vast part of outages is caused by digging incidents. Measures to decrease the number of incidents, e.g., better maps and increased knowledge of secure digging, will prevent a lot of outages.  Larger workforce for emergency shift: Assigning more workforce to emergency shifts will decrease outage recovery times.
Our model calculations have shown that the reliability of the Dutch regional electricity grids maintains its high level for the next ten years. After that period, additional measures are required, which will consist of a mix of preventive replacements of components and some or all of the measures mentioned above. Furthermore, when preventive replacement of components is the most favourable measure to maintain a high level of reliability in the future, it is recommendable to replace these components at natural moments, e.g., in case of extra capacity requirements, new functional requirements, or reconstructions carried out together with other network owners, such as waterworks.
RECOMMENDATIONS
Based on the results and scope of our study, we make the following recommendations for further research and consultation:  Determine at a strategic level which (long-term) SAIDI the DNOs aim for.  Further in-depth research into failure modes, failure behaviour and failure curves of components, in particular MV and LV cables.  Biennial evaluation and recalibration of the study, where model assumptions and estimations are adopted to advancing knowledge.
